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In the 1990s, several emerging market economies, such as Chile, 
Mexico, and a number of southeast Asian countries, displayed 
episodes of peaking growth rates combined with increasing current 
account deficits and appreciating currencies, which ended with abrupt 
reversions in capital flows and recessions.1 In all cases, optimism 
about future prospects was strong prior to the recessions. Mexico 
was negotiating both its entrance into the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and its membership in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Chile had undergone 
a smooth transition to democracy. Investors were increasingly 
enthusiastic about the prospects of harvesting the benefits of the 
market reforms introduced both in the previous period and under the 
new democracy. The southeast Asian economies, in turn, had their 
own reasons for optimism based on their impressive growth record of 
previous years. In all cases, optimism was grounded on reasonable 
arguments, but the prospects of future economic growth could not be 
estimated accurately.
1. A similar pattern can also be observed in industrial economies, such as the United 
States at the end of the 1990s, and in emerging markets in the late 1970s.
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In this paper, we show that overoptimistic perceptions of the future 
by domestic private agents—that is, domestic “exuberance”—could 
have been a cause of the boom-bust cycles observed in some emerging 
economies in the 1990s. To that end, we develop a multi-sector dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for a small economy with 
short-run stickiness in prices and wages and with expectations-driven 
boom-bust cycles. We show that under standard parameterization, the 
model is able to closely match most of the stylized facts observed in the 
boom-bust episodes in emerging markets. In the model, private agents 
are rational and forward looking, so their current decisions rely on 
their assessment of future productivity prospects. An overoptimistic 
assessment of future productivity makes them accumulate excess 
capital and over-increase their consumption, leading to a boom that 
is accompanied by a current account deficit. When agents realize that 
productivity will grow by less than expected, they must readjust their 
investment and consumption profiles, generating a current account 
reversal and a recession.
Our analytical approach closely follows Christiano and others 
(2007). We diverge from their work, however, in arguing that 
overoptimism about productivity trends, rather than productivity 
level changes, is the source of boom-bust cycles in open economies, 
as occurred in the 1990s. We show that if productivity levels follow a 
stationary process, then news about future productivity improvements 
are not able to replicate the real currency appreciation and the current 
account deterioration along the boom, as observed in the data. This 
result is related to the work of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), who show 
that the observed countercyclicality of the current account in emerging 
economies can be explained by productivity trend shocks in a standard 
real business cycle model.
According to our model, a boom-bust cycle generated by domestic 
agents’ overoptimism is observationally equivalent to a cycle driven 
by exogenous fluctuations in foreign financial conditions. Several 
authors claim that swings in external financial conditions were 
significant factors behind the observed patterns of macroeconomic 
variables in the 1990s in many emerging markets (Neumeyer and 
Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006; Valdés, 2007). In this sense, our 
results can be interpreted as a plausible complementary explanation 
for the episodes of abrupt current account deterioration in emerging 
markets in the 1990s.2 Among the policy implications, our model 
2. Our results do not provide a formal test in favor of overoptimism as an 
explanation of boom-bust cycles in emerging economies against other theories based 
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shows that the trade-offs faced by monetary policy in a boom-bust 
cycle driven by expectations are not trivial. If the central bank tries 
to stabilize output, the result will be a large fall in inflation and a 
contraction in output in the tradable goods sector. On the other hand, 
if the central bank targets inflation strictly, then the boom in activity, 
the current account deterioration, and the exchange rate appreciation 
will be larger, and the subsequent recession more severe. Finally, if 
the monetary authority adjusts the interest rate to reduce exchange 
rate fluctuations, then the perverse effects on the domestic tradable 
goods sector are only prevented in the short run, while the boom-bust 
cycle is amplified in other variables.
The idea of expectations-driven macroeconomic fluctuations goes 
back at least to Pigou (1926). Recently, this hypothesis has received 
renewed attention in modern macroeconomics. Marfán (2005) analyzes 
boom-bust cycles provoked by excess optimism and concentrates mainly 
on the role of fiscal policy in an extended Mundell-Fleming context. 
The optimist-pessimist mood of the private sector in his model is 
completely exogenous. Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2007), Jaimovich and 
Rebelo (2006, 2007), Mertens (2007), and Christiano and others (2007) 
present different unique-equilibrium rational expectation models 
in which business cycles are generated by changes in expectations 
regarding productivity prospects. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006, 2007), 
in particular, analyze the comovements of a set of variables generated 
in response to unmaterialized productivity shocks. They show that in 
a closed economy, adjustment costs in investment or labor (or both), 
variable capital utilization, and weak wealth effects on labor supply 
are key to replicating the comovements observed in the data. In an 
open economy, variable capital utilization turns out to be unimportant. 
Christiano and others (2007) emphasize the role played by the 
monetary policy at generating expectation-driven boom-bust cycles. 
Using a sticky-price, sticky-wages model they show that to generate 
a sizeable output expansion and a boom in stock prices in response 
to news about increased future productivity, monetary policy has to 
respond aggressively to the fall in inflation. The boom generated by 
overoptimistic perceptions about future productivity is thus amplified 
by a loose monetary policy. Mertens (2007) shows that an expectations-
driven real business cycle (RBC) model is able to replicate relevant 
stylized facts of Korea’s sudden stop in the late 1990s. Some studies 
on the Chilean crisis of 1982 also assign a responsibility to this boom-
bust episode to an erroneous perception by private agents regarding 
their wealth (Barandiarán 1983, Schmidt-Hebbel, 1988).566 Manuel Marfán, Juan Pablo Medina, and Claudio Soto
The expectations-driven business cycle approach in this literature 
is related to the literature on multiple equilibria and sunspot 
cycles (Farmer, 1993). It can also be viewed as complementary to 
the literature on rational herding and information cascade cycles, 
which emphasizes how improper aggregation of information may 
occasionally result in cycles led by nonfundamentals (Banerjee, 
1992; Chamley and Gale, 1994; Caplin and Leahy, 1993; Zeira, 
1994). In this paper, we examine whether the quantitative 
implications of (rational/nonsystematic) aggregate forecast errors 
can explain the observed pattern of boom-bust cycles in small open 
economies within a fully specified dynamic model that features a 
unique equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 
1 provides a motivation on the effects of economic reforms and 
innovations on the expected path for productivity, and describes 
some stylized facts for economies that went through boom-bust cycle 
episodes in the 1990s: namely, Chile, Korea, and Mexico. Section 
2 presents a detailed description of the theoretical model used 
to evaluate the effects of overoptimism in small open economies. 
Section 3 analyzes the dynamics of the model and discusses the 
tradeoffs faced by monetary policy. The final section summarizes 
our main findings.
1. sTrUCTUral reforMs and booM-bUsT CyCles in 
eMerging MarkeTs
Several emerging market economies engaged in reforms in the 
1980s and the 1990s. Moreover, with the fall of the Berlin wall, at 
the beginning of the 1990s, a generalized stimulus for accelerating 
and expanding market globalization was perceived. At the same 
time, emerging economies had resumed access to voluntary financial 
flows under favorable conditions, and trade markets were mutating 
toward increasing levels of regional integration. In this context, 
the international forums increasingly concentrated on the new 
international financial architecture, and the expansion of market 
institutions. While this macroeconomic context was prone to boost 
productivity, the actual effect of the reforms was hard to evaluate, 
given that the scenario was without precedent. It is possible, 
therefore, that private agents would have overestimated the effects 
of the reforms on future productivity.567 Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Monetary Policy
1.1 Structural Reforms, Innovations, and Productivity
Both, structural reforms and innovations give rise to delayed 
changes in productivity. For example, if Fi,t denotes the production 
function of a generic firm i at time t, the concomitant production 
function after a reform or a systemic innovation that stimulates 
productivity would be  Fit
'
,  = Fi,t At, where At measures the impact 
of the reform or innovation on productivity at time t. Figure 1 
presents examples of the effect on productivity of different types of 
innovations and reforms initiated at t = 0. First, we illustrate the 
effect on productivity of a Schumpeterian innovation –i.e. the steam 
machine, electricity, information and communication technology, and 
so forth. Initially, the destruction of capital, jobs, skills, and public 
goods related to the old technology dominates the creation process of 
the blossoming innovation. This would reduce measured productivity. 
At longer horizons, the benefits of the new technology outpace the 
costs of destroying the old one and measured productivity rises 
(the At curve could potentially turn concave at a very long horizon, 
showing decreasing returns).
Second, we present the case of a promarket reform (such as 
a trade-opening reform). Initially, measured productivity may 
fall as costly reallocation of resources from different sectors lead 
to temporary decreases in output. As time goes by, measured 
productivity increases and converges to a long-term productivity 
gain, A*, once the reform is completely internalized. A similar 
pattern would follow from a reform intended to improve human 
capital (education-improving reform). There is an initial period in 
which significant resources are diverted from other activities to 
implement the reform, with no immediate productive effects. The 
benefits of the reform start to be harvested when the new well-
educated generations graduate, and the reform is completed once 
the labor force is entirely educated.
In all the innovations or reforms described, there is no prior 
history to provide economic agents with the basis for accurately 
predicting its impact through time. Agents may know the functional 
form followed by At through time, but the values of certain 
parameters such as A* are initially uncertain. In this context, 
agents react first by setting notional values for A*, which may differ 
from their actual values. In all cases, it takes time for the reforms 
to materialize into actual productivity gains, making it hard to 
evaluate ex ante their real impact.568 Manuel Marfán, Juan Pablo Medina, and Claudio Soto
1.2 Some Stylized Facts
There is a set of stylized facts that characterizes the boom-
bust episodes in emerging market that engaged in reforms. In this 
subsection we describe some of them for three cases: Chile, Korea, 
and Mexico in the 1990s. 
Chile introduced a number of reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The democratic administrations that started in 1990 reinforced and 
deepened the structural reforms and gave a high priority to overall 
macroeconomic equilibrium. The signal to economic agents was that 
a strong stimulus to productivity growth was coming. Jadresic and 
Zahler (2000) claim based on time-series modeling, that key factors 
underlying the rapid productivity growth in the 1990s were precisely 
the deepening of democracy and the introduction of new structural 
reforms. Mexico implemented a privatization plan in the late 1980s, 
followed by a trade liberalization policy in the 1990s that involved 
Figure 1. Reforms and Their Impact on Productivity
A. Schumpeterian innovation B. Promarket reform
C. Education-improving reform
Source: Authors’ drawings.569 Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Monetary Policy
the future opening of its economy to trade and capital flows with the 
United States and Canada. Korea experienced a long period of rapid 
growth, low inflation, and a sustained improvement in living standards 
before being hit by the financial crisis of 1997. High domestic savings 
and investment contributed to Korea’s rapid transformation. The 
government had begun an economic reform program, which gained 
momentum in 1993–96, to gradually liberalize financial markets and 
the capital account.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 present some stylized facts for the three 
economies for the period 1990–2002.3 In all three cases, we 
identify a phase in which output rises above trend together with an 
increase in investment and consumption. During the boom phase, 
we also observe a real currency appreciation and current account 
deterioration in the three countries. For Mexico, the expansion 
in output was less dramatic than in Korea and Chile, but the 
consumption boom was comparable to those countries. All three 
cases experienced an abrupt reversion of the boom, with a fall in 
output, consumption, and investment and a steep reversion of the 
current account deficit. In Mexico and Korea, the bust coincided 
with a depreciation of the currency of almost 40 percent. In Chile, 
the depreciation of the currency during the bust was slower than 
in the other two countries.
The boom-bust cycle in these three countries involved swings 
in output and consumption of about 10 percent in a brief period of 
time. The swings were much larger in the case of investment, with 
differences of more than 20 percent from peak to trough. In Mexico 
and Chile, the contraction of the current account deficit did not lead 
to a surplus in this variable. For Korea, the current account deficit 
of almost 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) was followed 
by a similar surplus a couple of years after the peak of the boom. 
Unlike Chile and Mexico, Korea had a stunning recovery from the 
crisis and output regained its precrisis level. In the case of Chile, 
growth has not recovered the 1990s rate.
3. To build the stylized facts, we use Chilean quarterly data for the period 1990:1 
to 2002:4 from the Central Bank of Chile and the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
For Mexico and Korea, the source is the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). For all series, we applied a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a large 
smoothing parameter (λ = 3 x 106) to obtain an almost lineal trend. Once we filtered 
the series, we computed the respective cycles. We then proceeded to filter these series 
again to obtain a smoother pattern.Figure 2. Stylized Facts: Chile 
A. GDP B. Consumption
C. Investment D. Current account
E. Real exchange rate
Source: Authors’ calculations.Figure 3. Stylized Facts: Korea 
A. GDP B. Consumption
C. Investment D. Current account
E. Real exchange rate
Source: Authors’ calculations.Figure 4. Stylized Facts: Mexico 
A. GDP B. Consumption
C. Investment D. Current account
E. Real exchange rate
Source: Authors’ calculations.573 Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Monetary Policy
2. Model eConoMy
In this section, we present a multi-sector small open economy 
model with short-run nominal and real rigidities. The model is 
aimed at replicating prominent features of the business cycles of 
emerging market economies. There are two domestic productive 
sectors: one that produces tradable goods (H) and another that 
produces nontradable goods (N). Domestic agents also import 
foreign goods (F). Prices and wages are sticky in the short run, 
and the exchange rate pass-through to imported goods price is 
incomplete in the short run. Households exhibit habits in their 
preferences, investment is subject to incremental adjustment costs, 
and the capital utilization rate is variable. The introduction of 
nominal and real rigidities is meant to generate richer and more 
realistic propagation mechanisms.
2.1 Households
The domestic economy is inhabited by a continuum of households 
indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. At time t, household j maximizes the expected 
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where lt(j) is labor effort, Ct(j) is the household’s total consumption, 
and Mt(j) corresponds to nominal balances held at the beginning of 
period t. Parameter σL is the inverse real-wage elasticity of labor 
supply. Habit formation in preferences is determined by parameter h. 
Household j consumes a basket composed of tradable goods, CT, and 
nontradable goods, CN:
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Traded goods are a composite of domestically produce tradable 
goods (H) and imported goods (F), 




































Parameters αC and γC determine the share of each type of goods 
in the consumption basket, while ηC and ωC are the associated price 
elasticities. By minimizing the cost of the consumption basket and 
aggregating all households, we obtain the aggregate demands for the 
three types of goods. The consumer price index (CPI) is given by 
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where PT,t is the price index of the tradable consumption basket (which 
includes imported and domestic tradable goods), and PN,t is the price 
index of nontradable goods.
2.1.1 Consumption-savings decisions
Households have access to three types of assets: money, Mt(j); 
one-period noncontingent foreign bonds (denominated in foreign 
currency), Bt
*(j); and one-period domestic contingent bonds, Dt+1(j), 
which pays out one unit of domestic currency in a particular state 
(that is, state-contingent securities). The budget constraint of 
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where ∏t(j) are profits received from domestic firms, Wt(j) is the 
nominal wage set by the household, τt is per capita lump-sum net taxes 
from the government, and et is the nominal exchange rate (expressed 
as units of domestic currency per one unit of foreign currency). 
Variable dt,t+1 is the period t price of one-period domestic contingent 
bonds normalized by the probability of the occurrence of the state. 575 Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Monetary Policy
Assuming the existence of a full set of contingent bonds ensures that 
the consumption of all households is the same, independently of the 
labor income they receive each period. Variable it
* is the interest 
rate on foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency, and Θ(.) is a 
premium domestic households have to pay when borrowing abroad. 
This premium is a function of the net foreign asset positions relative 
to GDP, bt = et Bt
*/PY,tYt where PY,tYt is nominal GDP and Bt
* is the 
aggregate net asset position of the economy.4
Each household chooses a consumption path and the composition of 
its portfolio by maximizing equation (1) subject to its budget constraint. 
The first-order conditions on different contingent claims over all 
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where it is the domestic risk-free interest rate. From this expression 
and the first-order condition with respect to foreign bonds denominated 
in foreign currency, we obtain the following expression for the 























where covt is a covariance term that disappears in the log-linear 
version of the model.
2.1.2 Labor supply and wage setting
Each household j is a monopolistic supplier of a differentiated 
labor service. There is a set of perfectly competitive labor service 
assemblers that hire labor from each household and combine it into 
an aggregate labor service unit. This labor unit is then used as an 
input in production in the domestic tradables (H) and nontradables 
4. We assume that Θ(.) = Θ and Θ′b/Θ = θ in the steady state. When the country is a 
net debtor, θ corresponds to the elasticity of the upward-slopping supply of international 
funds. This premium is introduced mainly as a technical device to ensure stationarity 
(see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003).576 Manuel Marfán, Juan Pablo Medina, and Claudio Soto
(N) sectors. Cost minimization by labor unit assemblers gives rise to 
demands for each type of labor service, which are a function of the 
corresponding relative wages.
Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we assume that 
wage setting is subject to a nominal rigidity à la Calvo (1983). In 
each period, each type of household faces a probability 1 – φL of being 
able to reoptimize its nominal wage. In this setup, the parameter 
φL determines the degree of nominal rigidity in wages. We assume 
that all those households that cannot reoptimize their wages follow 
an updating rule considering a geometric weighted average of past 
CPI inflation and the inflation target set by the authority, π. Once 
a household has set its wage, it must supply any quantity of labor 
service demanded at that wage. A particular household j that is able 
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subject to labor demand and the updating rule for the nominal wage 













− + () + () ππ
χ χ
Variable Λt,t+i is the relevant discount factor between periods t and 
t + i.5 These elements give rise to a Phillips curve for nominal wages 
that has backward- and forward-looking components.
2.2 Investment and Capital Goods
A representative firm owns and rents capital to firms producing 
in the domestic tradables (H) and nontradables (N) sectors. We 
assume that capital is specific to the sector that rents it. Hence, 
the representative firm decides how much of each type of capital to 
5. Since utility exhibits habit formation in consumption, the relevant discount 
factor is given by Λt,t+i = βi[(Ct(j) – hCt–1) / (Ct+i(j) – hCt+i–1)]. 577 Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Monetary Policy
accumulate over time. The flow of investment devoted to produce 
new capital goods for sector J, It(J), is assembled using the following 
technology: 
































for J = H, N, where


































is a composite of tradable goods devoted to investment in sector J. 
Variable ID,t(J) corresponds to the amount of good D = H, F, N used 
in assembling new capital goods for sector J.
The representative firm may adjust investment each period, but 
changing the flow of investment is costly. This assumption is introduced 
as a way to obtain more inertia in the demand for investment (see 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).6 Let Zt(J) and ut(J) be the 
rental price and the utilization rate of capital in sector J, respectively. 
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subject to the law of motion of the capital stock for sector J, 
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6. This assumption is a shortcut to more cumbersome approaches to modeling 
investment inertia, such as time-to-build models.578 Manuel Marfán, Juan Pablo Medina, and Claudio Soto
where δ(ut) is the depreciation rate, which is a function of the capital 
utilization rate. We assume that δ(ut) is an increasing function, which 
implies that a higher utilization rate depreciates physical capital faster 
than a lower rate. Function S(.) characterizes the adjustment cost 
for investment. This adjustment cost function satisfies the following 
conditions: S(1 + gy) = 1, S′(1 + gy) = 0, S′′(1 + gy) = –µS < 0, where gy 
is the per capita growth rate of the economy in the steady state.
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The ratio PI,t / PC,t is the real cost of producing new capital goods (that 
is, the price of the investment bundle deflated by the CPI), where 
PP P It I It IN t T
I I I
, , ,




− − − α α




PP P It IH t I Ft T
I I I
, , ,




− − − γ γ
ω ω ω 1 1
1
1 (1 )
Equations (5), (6), and (7) simultaneously determine the evolution 
of the shadow price of capital, Qt(J), real investment expenditure, and 
the capital utilization rate for each sector.579 Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Monetary Policy
2.3 Domestic Production
There is a large set of firms that use a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) technology to assemble intermediate varieties 
into home goods sold to households, to firms producing new capital 
goods, and to foreign agents. There is also a large set of firms that 
use a similar CES technology to assemble intermediate varieties into 
nontradable goods sold to households and to firms producing new 
capital goods.
Let YN,t be the total quantity of nontradable goods sold to domestic 
agents (households and the representative firm assembling new capital 
goods). The demand for a generic variety zN to assemble nontradable 
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where PN,t(zN) is the price of variety zN. Analogously, let YH,t be 
quantity of home goods sold domestically, and YHt ,
*  the quantity sold 
abroad. The demands for a particular variety zH to assemble these 
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where PH(zH) is the price of the variety zH when used to assemble home 
goods sold in the domestic market, and Pz Ht H , ()
*  is the foreign-currency 
price of this variety when used to assemble home goods sold abroad. 
Variables PH,t and PHt ,
*  are the corresponding aggregate price indexes. 
The foreign demand for home goods, YHt ,















    


     
ζ
η
,580 Manuel Marfán, Juan Pablo Medina, and Claudio Soto
where Yt
* is foreign output, ζ* corresponds to the share of domestic 
intermediate goods in the consumption basket of foreign agents, and 
η* is the price elasticity of demand.
Intermediate varieties in the tradables and nontradables sectors 
are produced by monopolistically competitive firms. These firms 
maximize profits by choosing the prices of their differentiated variety 
subject to the corresponding demands and the available technology. 
Let YJ,t(zJ) be the total quantity produced of a particular variety zJ in 
sector J = H, N. The available technology is given by 








   (10)
for J = H, N, where lt(zJ) is the amount of labor and Kt(zJ) is the amount 
of physical capital used in production. Parameter ηJ defines the shares 
of the different factors in production. The variable AJ,t represents a 
stationary productivity shock common to all firms in sector J, while 
Tt is a stochastic trend in labor productivity that is common to both 
domestic sectors (H and N). Below we discuss the process followed by 
these shocks.
We assume that the price adjustment of the domestic varieties 
faces nominal rigidities à la Calvo. In every period, the probability 
that a firm producing home goods receives a signal for adjusting 
its price for the domestic market is 1−φHD , and the probability of 
adjusting its price for the foreign market is 1−φHF. Analogously, 
the probability that a firm producing nontradable varieties receives 
a signal for adjusting its price is 1 – φN. These probabilities are the 
same for all firms, independent of their history. If a firm does not 
receive a signal, it updates its price following a simple rule that 
weights past inflation and the inflation target set by the central 
bank. Thus, when a firm receives a signal to adjust its price, it 
maximizes the discounted expected value of its profits, conditional 
on having to passively update its price for a number of periods 
and subject to equation (9) or (8). Given this pricing structure, the 
paths for inflation of domestic tradable (H) and nontradable (N) 
goods are given by new Keynesian Philips curves with indexation. 
In its log-linear form, inflation in sector J depends on both last 
period’s inflation, expected inflation next period, and marginal 
cost in sector J. 581 Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Monetary Policy
2.4 Import Goods Retailers
We introduce local-currency price stickiness to allow for incomplete 
exchange rate pass-through into import prices in the short run. This 
feature of the model mitigates the expenditure-switching effect of 
exchange rate movements for a given degree of substitution between 
foreign and home goods.
There is a set of competitive assemblers that use a CES technology 
to combine a continuum of differentiated imported varieties to produce 
a final foreign good, YF. This good is consumed by households and 
used for assembling new capital goods. The optimal mix of imported 
varieties in the final foreign good defines the demands for each of 
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where εF is the elasticity of substitution among imported varieties, 
PF,t(zF) is the domestic-currency price of imported variety zF in the 
domestic market, and PF,t is the aggregate price of import goods in 
this market.
Importing firms buy varieties abroad and resell them domestically 
to assemblers. Each importing firm has monopoly power in the 
domestic retailing of a particular variety. They adjust the domestic 
price of their varieties infrequently, only when they receive a signal. 
The signal arrives with probability 1 – φF each period. As in the case 
of domestically produced varieties, if a firm does not receive a signal, 
it updates its price following a passive rule that weights past inflation 
and the inflation target set by the central bank. Therefore, when a 
generic importing firm zF receives a signal, it chooses a new price 
by maximizing the discounted sum of expected profits subject to the 
domestic demand for variety zF (equation 11) and the updating rule.
Under this specification, changes in the nominal exchange rate 
will not immediately be passed through to prices of imported good sold 
domestically. Therefore, exchange rate pass-through will be incomplete 
in the short run. In the long run, firms freely adjust their prices, so 
the law of one price for foreign goods holds up to a constant.7 
7. Formally, in the long run, PF = [εF / (εF – 1)] eP  F
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2.5 Monetary Policy Rule
Monetary policy is modeled as a simple feedback rule for the 
interest rate. Under the baseline specification of the model, we 
assume that the central bank adjusts the policy rate in response to 
contemporaneous deviations of CPI inflation from the target and to 
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,
where πt = PC,t / PC,t – 1 – 1 is consumer price inflation, i is the steady-
state value of the nominal interest rate, π is the inflation target, and 
Yt is the output trend.
2.6 Aggregate Equilibrium
Once firms producing domestic varieties set their prices, they must 
supply any quantity demanded at those given prices. Therefore, the 
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where YN,t = CN,t + IN,t(H) + IN,t(N) and YH,t = CH,t + IH,t(H) + IH,t(N) 
and where YHt F ,
*  was defined above. The equilibrium requires that 
total labor demanded by intermediate varieties producers must be 
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where lt is aggregate labor service. Also, the demand for physical 
capital in sector J has to be equal to the available amount: 
0
1
() () ∫ = Kzdz KJ tJ Jt ,
for J = H, N.
Using the equilibrium conditions in the goods and labor markets 
and the budget constraint of households and the government, we 
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,
where bt is the aggregate net (liquid) asset position of the economy vis-
à-vis the rest of the world relative to nominal GDP, and PY,tYt = PC,tCt 
+ PI,tIt + PX,tXt – PM,tMt is nominal GDP measured from the demand 
side. Nominal imports and exports are given by PM,tMt = etP*
F,tY*
F,t 
and PX,tXt = etP*
H,tY*
H,t, respectively. The total quantity of imported 
goods is YF,t = CF,t + IF,t(H) + IF,t(N).
2.7 Model Calibration and Solution
To solve the model, we first tackle the nonstochastic steady state 
using numerical methods. We then solve the log-linearized decision 
rules from the behavioral equations and the equilibrium conditions 
of the model. To that end, we use the QZ factorization described in 
Uhlig (1997). Table 1 presents the value chosen for the structural 
parameters of the model. The calibration is meant to characterize 
quarterly data for the Chilean economy. Many of the parameters 
were taken directly from the literature; others were chosen to match 
long-run features of this economy. In our simulations, productivity 
shocks are calibrated to match the observed expansion in output 




β Subjective discount factor (quarterly)  0.999
σL  Inverse of the elasticity of the labor supply  1.0
h Habit formation coefficient  0.9
αC Share of tradable goods in the consumption basket 0.4
γC Share of home goods in the tradables consumption 
basket
0.5
ηC Elasticity of substitution between tradable and 
nontradable goods in the consumption basket
0.5
ωC Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign 
goods in the tradables consumption basket
1.0
εL Elasticity of substitution among labor varieties 11
φL Calvo probb in nominal wages  0.9
χL Wage indexation to past inflation 0.9
αI Share of tradable goods in the investment basket [in 
I(H) and I(N)]
0.6
γI Share of home goods in the tradable investment 
basket [in I(H) and I(N)]
0.5
ηI Elasticity of substitution between tradable and 
nontradable goods in the investment basket [in I(H) 
and I(N)]
0.5
ωI Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign 
goods in the tradable investment basket [in I(H) 
and I(N)]
1.0
δ(1) Capital depreciation rate (annual) [in I(H) and I(N)] 5.0 percent
µS Elasticity of the adjustment cost in the flow of 
investment [in I(H) and I(N)]
15
σI Elasticity of the cost of capital utilization rate 
[δ’’(1)/ δ’(1)]
0.05
ηH Labor share in the domestic tradable goods sector 0.65
ηN Labor share in the nontradable goods sector 0.65
εN Elasticity of substitution among nontradable 
varieties
11
εH Elasticity of substitution among domestic tradable 
varieties
11
εF Elasticity of substitution among imported varieties 11
φHD Calvo probb in prices of domestic tradable goods 
sold domestically
0.75
χHD Indexation to past inflation of domestic tradable 
goods sold domestically
0.50
φHF Calvo probb in foreign currency prices of domestic 
tradable goods sold abroad 





χHF Indexation to past inflation of domestic tradable 
goods sold abroad
0.50
φN Calvo probb in prices of nontradable goods 0.75
χN Indexation to past inflation of nontradable goods 0.50
φF Calvo probb in prices of imported goods 0.75
χF Indexation to past inflation of imported goods 0.50
ψi Smoothing coefficient in the Taylor-type rule 0.80
ψπ Inflation coefficient in the Taylor-type rule 1.75
ψy Output coefficient in the Taylor-type rule 0.20
ηF Elasticity of the foreign demand for domestic 
tradable goods
0.50
θ Elasticity of the external premium to the debt-to-
GDP ratio
0.00001
NX/Y Steady-state net-exports-to-GDP ratio 2 percent
CA/Y Steady-state current-account-to-GDP ratio –2 percent
gy Steady state GDP growth rate 5 percent
ρaH Persistence of productivity level shock in sector H  0.999
ρaN Persistence of productivity level shock in sector N  0.999
ρT Persistence of productivity trend shock 0.999




3. booM-bUsT CyCles in sMall open eConoMies
We take Chile as a reference country and utilize the model 
described in the previous section to evaluate the qualitative and 
quantitative implications of boom-bust cycles driven by expectations. 
Before considering the case of overoptimism about future productivity, 
we analyze a case of favorable external financial conditions that are 
abruptly reversed.
In what follows, we define the real exchange rate in the model as 
the relative price of domestic tradable (H) and nontradable (N) goods. 
The implied evolution of measured total factor productivity (TFP) 
is estimated in the model as an aggregate Solow residual (without 
adjusting for the capital utilization rate). We construct a similar 586 Manuel Marfán, Juan Pablo Medina, and Claudio Soto
measure using actual data for Chile.8 Tobin’s Q is identified in the data 
with the stock market price, which in the case of Chile corresponds 
to an aggregate price index (IPSA). In the data, labor is measured as 
the ratio of formal employment to the working age population, and 
the real wage corresponds to an index of labor costs.9
3.1 Foreign Financial Condition Reversal
According to several authors, the boom-bust cycle in many 
emerging market economies in the 1990s was a consequence of 
changes in external financial conditions. This conclusion is based on 
the observation that periods of favorable external financial conditions 
are associated with economic expansions, while depressed economic 
activity coincides with periods of less beneficial foreign financial 
conditions (see, for example, Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and 
Yue, 2006; Valdés 2007). Favorable external financial conditions in the 
early 1990s implied large capital flows to emerging market economies, 
which produced an economic boom coupled with real exchange rate 
appreciations and current account deficits. The boom phase was 
then followed by an abrupt worsening in foreign financial conditions, 
triggered by the Asian crisis, which would have led to recessions. 
Using our model, we analyze the case of an exogenous, highly 
persistent decrease in the foreign interest rate (i*). This captures the 
idea of a relaxation of the foreign financial conditions. Then, we assume 
that suddenly there is an exogenous increase on the foreign interest 
rate back to its original level. We calibrate the size of the shock so that 
the boom in output roughly coincides with the data for Chile. Figure 5 
presents the results of this exercise. The model produces expansions 
in output, labor, consumption, and investment, which are sharply 
reversed when the foreign interest rate returns back to its original 
level. During the expansion, the real exchange appreciates by 10 
percent, and the current account deficit (as a percentage of GDP) peaks 
near 6 percent. Contrary to what the data show, the model predicts 
an initial fall in inflation and a subsequent rise in this variable as 
the exchange rate depreciates. Despite the muted pass-through from 
exchange rate to domestic prices, the fall in inflation is due to the 
8. Formally, ln(TFPt) = ln(Yt) – ηln(lt) – (1 – η)ln(Kt), where η is the labor share 
in aggregate output.
9. To construct the cyclical components for these series, we follow the same 
procedure described in footnote 3.Figure 5. Foreign Financial Condition Reversal
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initial appreciation of the currency. The episode is accompanied by a 
rise in Tobin’s Q for both types of capital. The boom in total output is 
driven by the evolution of output in the nontradable goods sector. In 
fact, the real currency appreciation leads to an initial fall in output 
in the tradable goods sector. Overall, the story of a boom-bust cycle 
driven by changes in foreign financial conditions is able to satisfactorily 
account for the stylized facts for Chile.
3.2 Overoptimistic Perceptions
We now explore an alternative—though complementary—
explanation for the boom-bust cycle based on the idea that, rather 
than being caused by external factors, the cycle was triggered by 
domestic private agents’ misperception regarding future productivity 
prospects. As mentioned above, this idea has recently been formalized 
by Christiano and others (2007) in a fully specified closed economy 
model. We build on their approach to model overoptimistic news on 
future productivity improvements.
3.2.1 Productivity level shocks
We first assume that productivity in sector J = N, H is governed 
by the following stationary process:
aa Jt aJ ta tp at J J J , , 1 = , ρζ ε − − ++ , ,    (12)
for J = H, N, where aJ,t = lnAJ,t and εσ at a J J N , ∼ 0,
2 ()  are independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) innovations. The varaible ζatp J , −  
is a shock to the expected future productivity level p periods ahead 
and is uncorrelated with εat J , . This shock captures the idea discussed 
in section 1, that structural reforms lead to expected changes in 
productivity. Those changes take time to materialize, however, and 
the agents do not exactly know their effective impact on productivity. 
Here, we assume that at time t, private agents learn that a set of 
reforms were carried out and, given equation (12), they expect that 
productivity p periods ahead will be given by
Ea a tJ tp a
p
Jt at J J , , = + 
 
 + ρζ , ,
where ζat J , > 0. At time t + p, agents learn that the productivity level 
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εatp J , + < 0, on productivity at t + p. Figure 6 presents the results of this 
exercise, assuming p = 12 and ρaJ =0 .999 together with actual data 
for Chile.10 We consider a case in which the news affects the expected 
productivity levels in both sectors (H and N) equally.11
As in Christiano and others (2007), the expected gain in productivity 
produces a boom in output. In our case, this is mainly due to the boom 
in the tradable goods sector. In fact, output in the nontradables sector 
falls in the short run and then increases. Consumption initially falls, 
but then it slowly expands in response to the expected increase in 
productivity. Labor rises during the boom phase, in part as a result of 
sticky wages that contain real wages growth. When wages are flexible 
in our model, the labor expansion no longer holds.12 This is consistent 
with Jaimovich and Rebelo (2007), who show that under flexible 
wages, in order to generate a boom in labor in response to expected 
gains in productivity, household preferences should exhibit a weak 
wealth effect on labor supply. In our case, preferences are standard, 
but the wealth effect on the labor supply is muted because of sticky 
wages. Total inflation falls with the output boom. The reason is that 
expected future productivity gains mean lower future marginal costs. 
Since inflation is forward looking, firms respond by currently lowering 
their prices, despite the rise in actual marginal cost associated with 
the growth of labor and the rise in real wages.
Despite the expected increase in future productivity, investment 
and Tobin’s Q initially fall in both sectors when the signal on future 
productivity arrives. These variables then increase monotonically 
until the agents learn that productivity is lower than expected. These 
predictions on the behavior of investment and Tobin’s Q during the 
news-induced boom-bust cycle are different from the predictions 
obtained by Christiano and others (2007). In their model, the boom-
bust cycle in output coincides with a boom-bust cycle for investment 
and Tobin’s Q. The reason investment responds this way to news 
about future productivity in Christiano and others (2007) is the 
presence of low wage indexation to past inflation and an aggressive 
inflation-targeting policy rule for the central bank. In their case, 
given the fall of inflation below target, monetary policy follows a 
10. These productivity news shocks are highly persistent, but they are still 
transitory.
11. The real quantities in the figures correspond to the normalized effects of the 
productivity shock.
12. The simulation under flexible wages is available on request.Figure 6. Productivity Level Signal
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loose stance in response to the news shock. That helps raise Tobin’s 
Q and induces firms to increase investment. Low indexation to 
past inflation, in turn, helps keep real wages rigid in the short run, 
amplifying the effects of overoptimistic shocks. In our calibration, we 
allow for a larger fraction of wages to be indexed to past inflation, 
and we specify a less hawkish inflation targeting regime –that is 
more in line with standard parameterization for the monetary policy 
rule. In figure 6, we also present an alternative calibration of the 
model, where we reduce the fraction of wages being indexed to past 
inflation (we set χL = 0.1) and increase the reaction of the interest 
rate to deviations of inflation from target in the policy rule (we set 
ψπ = 2.0). Under this alternative parameterization, the results of 
our simulation are in line with Christiano and others (2007): output, 
labor, consumption, investment, and Tobin’s Q simultaneously 
feature a boom-bust cycle.
While the qualitative results of this last exercise resemble some 
features of the stylized facts discussed in section 1, they fall short in 
comparison with the observed size of the boom-bust cycle in investment 
and consumption in Chile. More importantly, the simulation misses 
two prominent features of the boom-bust cycles in emerging economies 
in the 1990s, namely, the real appreciation of the exchange rate and 
the current account deficit. Despite the boom in consumption and 
investment, which tends to produce a current account deficit, the 
exchange rate depreciation leads to an improvement in net exports 
that offsets the detrimental impact on this variable associated with 
the expansion in consumption and investment. In other words, the 
expenditure-switching effect induced by the currency depreciation 
dominates the intertemporal effect of the shock. The counterfactual 
behavior of the real exchange rate and the current account are even 
worse under the baseline calibration.
As we mentioned, one of the reasons for the boom after a news 
shock in the closed economy model of Christiano and others (2007) 
is the loose monetary policy response to the shock. In our model, a 
more expansive monetary policy is not enough to generate a sizable 
boom in expenditure. First, in a closed economy, the policy interest 
rate determines the equilibrium between domestic investment and 
savings. In an open economy, investment can differ from domestic 
saving. Moreover, both the domestic and foreign interest rates affect 
the cost of financing in an open economy. If the foreign interest rate 
is constant—and if the country does not face external borrowing 
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the relevant cost of financing. As a result, the response of investment 
to a news shock is less intense. Second, the increase in private 
consumption in response to a future expected increase in productivity 
depends on the expected present value of private income. In a closed 
economy, the sequence of interest rates relevant for discounting future 
incomes is determined by monetary policy. Thus, if monetary policy 
is expansive in response to a signal shock, the perceived increase in 
the present value of income is amplified. In a small open economy 
facing a constant foreign interest rate, monetary policy alone does 
not determine the relevant interest rate for discounting expected 
future incomes. Hence, a loose monetary policy has a limited effect 
in amplifying the consumption boom.
As mentioned, the model fails at producing a real currency 
appreciation along the boom phase of the cycle. In a two-sector small 
open economy with tradable and nontradable goods, a real currency 
appreciation requires an increase in real wages. However, the fact 
that nominal wages are sticky in our model prevents an upward 
adjustment in real wages. This nominal stickiness is necessary to 
produce a sizable boom and to generate a procyclical response of 
employment to the shock.
3.2.2 Productivity trend shocks
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) argue that in the case of emerging 
market economies, stochastic productivity trends, rather than 
productivity level shocks, are a major source of business cycle 
fluctuations. Moreover, these types of shocks are able to explain 
the observed comovement in major aggregate variables in these 
economies. In particular, shocks to the trend are better equipped to 
produce strongly countercyclical current accounts, as observed in 
emerging economies. More importantly, these shocks can generate 
these comovements without relying on household preferences that 
remove wealth effects in the labor supply.13
In what follows, we incorporate the approach of Aguiar and 
Gopinath (2007) to our analysis by assuming that news shocks refer 
to future changes in productivity trends. We assume that the natural 
logarithm of the stochastic trend of labor productivity, Tt, evolves 
according to the following expression: 
13. See Correia, Neves, and Rebelo (1995) for an analysis of the aggregate dynamics 
in a small open economy without wealth effects in the labor supply. 593 Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Monetary Policy
ss gs Tt Tt T y TT tT tp Tt ,, 1 , 1, , =( 1) (1 ) − − − +− ++ ++ ρ ρ ζε ln , ∆    (13)
where sT,t = ln(Tt) and εT,t ∼ N(0, σ2
T) are i.i.d. innovations. A shock 
ζT,t–p corresponds to a news of an increase in the labor productivity 
trend p periods ahead. As in the previous case, we assume that this 
shock is uncorrelated with εT,t. If agents receive a signal, ζT,t > 0, at time 
t, they expect that productivity p periods ahead will grow faster: 
Es s g tT tp T
p
Tt T y Tt ∆ ∆ , , , = (1) (1 ) + 
 
 +− + 
 
 + ρ ρ ζ ln .
As in the case of news about productivity levels, we consider a shock 
εT,t+p < 0 in period t + p to capture the idea that the news about expected 
productivity growth turns out to be overoptimistic ex post.
Figure 7 presents the trajectories of the endogenous variables to 
an expected shock to the trend in the future that does not materialize 
when p = 12 and ρT = 0.999. These trajectories were obtained using 
the baseline calibration of the model. The qualitative results of this 
shock are similar to those obtained with a positive signal to the 
productivity level in the future. We observe a boom-bust episode 
in output, labor, investment, and consumption. The quantitative 
pattern followed by the last three variables more closely resembles 
the data than in the previous case. Positive news regarding future 
productivity trend also generates a real appreciation of the exchange 
rate, as in the stylized facts reported earlier. The current account 
deficit reaches almost 7 percent, which is also very similar to what 
happened in Chile in the late 1990s, before the Asian crisis. In our 
model, the real appreciation explains why the output boom is mainly 
concentrated in the nontradable goods sector. This is completely 
different from the case of a productivity level signal, where the 
boom is explained by the expansion of the tradable goods sector. 
In the bust phase, as the expected increase in productivity growth 
does not materialize, the real exchange rate depreciates and the 
current account deficit reverses. There is a recession in output, and 
aggregate demand falls.
Despite the fact that productivity does not change, the measured 
TFP in the model rises above trend during the boom phase and falls 
during the bust phase. This pattern resembles the observed evolution 
of TFP constructed with actual Chilean data, which highlights the 
strong procyclicality of this variable. The model also predicts an Figure 7. Productivity Trend Signal
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increase in Tobin’s Q during the boom and a subsequent fall during 
the recession. However, the size of the cycle of this variable is smaller 
than the observed pattern in Chilean stock prices in the 1990s. The 
model is also not able to closely replicate the behavior of inflation 
in Chile.
In our model, the boom-bust episode does not arise as a 
consequence of a loosening in monetary policy in response to a 
fall in inflation, as in Christiano and others (2007). Moreover, the 
dynamics of several variables in response to an overoptimistic signal 
regarding future productivity trends are observational equivalent to 
those obtained from a reversal in foreign financial conditions. Thus, 
overconfidence in productivity prospects is able to satisfactorily 
generate the boom-bust episode observed in emerging economies 
without any actual change in the economic fundamentals.
3.3 Monetary Policy Trade-offs
To explore the different monetary policy trade-offs in a boom-
bust episode such as the one described here, we analyze the 
implications of alternative policy rules. First, we consider two 
alternative rules: one that reacts strongly to inflation and another 
that responds strongly to output. Second, we consider a rule in 
which monetary policy responds not only to output and inflation, 
but also to real exchange rate fluctuations. In all simulations below, 
we consider the responses after news about a future change in the 
productivity trend.
Figure 8 presents the baseline scenario, together with the 
results under a rule that is more aggressive to inflation and under 
a rule that is more aggressive to output fluctuations. If monetary 
policy focuses on following a more strict inflation target (ψπ = 3), 
the boom in output, consumption, and investment would be larger 
because monetary policy takes a more expansive stance. The 
current account deficit would therefore also be larger, and the 
real appreciation would be slightly smaller. On the other hand, 
if monetary policy aggressively tries to stabilize output (ψy = 0.8), 
then it would induce a larger negative deviation of inflation from 
target and a larger currency appreciation. Given this currency 
appreciation, output stabilization is based proportionally more on 
tradables output than on nontradables output. The higher interest 
rate implied by this policy reduces the boom in Tobin’s Q in both 
sectors and the current account deficit.Figure 8. Stabilization of Inflation versus Output
Source: Authors’ calculations.597 Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Monetary Policy
In the case of a central bank that responds to exchange rate 
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where RERt is the real exchange rate and RER is its steady-state 
value. We calibrate ψrer to 0.2. The rest of the parameters of the rule 
are same as in the baseline calibration. This policy rule is motivated by 
the Chilean experience in the 1990s, when the Central Bank of Chile 
simultaneously specified an inflation target and a target zone for the 
exchange rate to avoid excessive fluctuation in the latter. Figure 9 
presents the results. Under this policy, monetary policy tends to be 
more expansive in response to the expected productivity gain. As a 
result, the increases in output, consumption, investment, and labor 
are larger than in the baseline case. The alternative rule reduces the 
volatility of the exchange rate, which prevents the perverse effects of 
the boom on the domestic tradable goods sector in the short run, but 
the current account deficit responds more sharply to the shock than 
in the baseline case, as a result of the investment and consumption 
booms. Inflation initially rises, but it falls after the bust because the 
reduction in marginal cost dominates the inflationary effects of the 
subsequent currency depreciation. Finally, by stabilizing the real 
exchange rate, the monetary policy exacerbates the boom-bust cycle 
in Tobin’s Q and makes the predictions of the model quantitatively 
closer to the evolution of stock prices in Chile in the 1990s.
4. ConClUsions
Using a small open economy DSGE model, we have shown that 
expected future gains in productivity that are not materialized ex post 
can generate a boom-bust cycle in output similar to what occurred 
in several emerging market economies in the 1990s. However, 
when people expect future productivity gains to be transitory level 
changes, the model predictions for the current account and the real 
exchange rate are not consistent with the observed pattern in those 
episodes. Moreover, the quantitative predictions for investment 
and consumption fall short with respect to what we observe in the 
data. This is the case even if we assume a strong monetary policy 
response to inflation and a low degree of wage indexation to past Figure 9. Stabilization of the Real Exchange Rate
Source: Authors’ calculations.599 Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Monetary Policy
inflation. The reason is that in an open economy setup, the amplifying 
mechanism of monetary policy is unable to induce large consumption 
and investment booms.
When the expected future improvement in productivity corresponds 
to a trend shock, for which the productivity growth rate is expected 
to increase above its steady-state rate during some periods, the 
model predictions satisfactorily match the stylized facts observed 
in the data. Also, the boom generated by a news shock about future 
productivity trend affects the nontradable goods sector more deeply 
than the tradables sector. In fact, the real currency appreciation 
induced by the shock leads to a fall in output in the tradable goods 
sector. These results almost exactly replicate the results obtained 
under an exogenous reversal in the foreign financial conditions faced 
by the country.
Monetary policy faces important trade-offs in a boom-bust episode 
driven by overoptimistic perceptions about productivity improvements. 
On the one hand, if the central bank tries to stabilize output, it will 
exacerbate the fall in inflation and contraction in output in the tradable 
goods sector. On the other, if the central bank targets inflation more 
strictly, then the boom in activity, the current account deterioration, 
and the exchange rate appreciation will be larger and the subsequent 
recession more severe.
In the period under study, the Central Bank of Chile simultaneously 
pursued a target zone for the exchange rate and an inflation target. 
If we modify the policy rule in our model to capture this behavior by 
including an endogenous response of the interest rate to exchange rate 
fluctuations, then it does a better job of fitting the data. This type of 
policy only prevents the perverse effects of the boom on the domestic 
tradable goods sector in the short run, but it amplifies the boom-bust 
cycle in the other aggregate variables.600 Manuel Marfán, Juan Pablo Medina, and Claudio Soto
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